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Metz: An African Theory of Good Leadership

An African Theory of Good Leadership
Thaddeus Metz

Introducing African Values
International academic reflection on good leadership has tended to follow
the rise of political or economic power, first in the West and then in the East.
As has been pointed out, ideas indigenous to Africa are under-represented
in the English-speaking literature on leadership (Blunt & Jones, 1997;
Ncube, 2010:77–78). The authors of a book devoted to personal growth
suggest, “Of all the gifts that Africa has given the world, African values
in leadership have not yet claimed the place that they could” (Nussbaum,
Palsule, & Mkhize, 2010:5).
There are a number of reasons for thinking that this ignorance of African1
understandings of good leadership is unwelcome. One familiar rationale is
that interaction in a globalized world requires familiarity with the views
of “the other” as a matter of prudence. Another important rationale is
that any long-standing culture probably has some insight into the human
condition, such that one risks being mistaken about what counts as a good
leader if one remains unfamiliar with African culture. Despite having been
a largely oral tradition until recently, African philosophy and related ideas
have been in existence for at least several hundred years and, as this article is
meant to show, their implications for leadership merit global consideration.
This article draws on the indigenous African intellectual tradition to
ground a moral-philosophical theory of leadership that is meant to constitute a plausible rival to salient accounts of leadership in the East Asian
and Western traditions. Specifically, it articulates an interpretation of the
characteristically African value of communion and indicates how this Afrocommunal value system grounds a certain ideal approach to leadership.
Along the way, the article contrasts the implications of Afro-communal
leadership, particularly with those of Confucianism and Kantian contract
theory, and suggests that, by comparison, the African theory deserves to
be treated as a viable alternative to them.
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This article does not appeal to all prescriptive ideas about African leadership in the contemporary literature or from traditional practices. Instead
of trying to accommodate every idea from the African context, this article
advances a reading of one purportedly basic value from it that should be
taken seriously by a twenty-first century, open-minded ethicist or related
enquirer from any part of the world and then considers what it entails for
good leadership. Such a moral orientation, as is spelled out in the next
section (sec. 2), is relational. After spelling out this specifically communal
ethic, the article draws out of it a conception of good leadership (sec. 3), and
then applies this conception to a variety of topics, including how decisions
ought to be made within a firm or other large organization, who counts
as a stakeholder, and how to deal with non-performing or misbehaving
employees (sec. 4). For each topic, the article notes respects in which Afrocommunal leadership supports approaches that differ from those prescribed
by other, more internationally familiar views of it, and it suggests that its
implications are prima facie attractive relative to them.

Communion as a Basic African Value
In recent years there have been a number of literate, philosophical interpretations of the African ethical tradition (e.g., Bujo, 1997; Gyekye, 1997),
but this article draws on one according to which communal relationship is
to be pursued as an end, and not merely means to some other value such as
society’s well-being or people’s life force (an imperceptible vital energy that
has come from God). This interpretation is advanced as merely one plausible moral philosophy grounded on sub-Saharan customs, and specifically
as an attractive way to understand two maxims widely taken to capture
indigenous sub-Saharan ethical thought, namely, “I am because we are”
and “A person is a person through other persons.”2
These phrases are routinely used to express an ethical judgment, specifically the prescription to become a real self or a complete person (Wiredu,
1992; Menkiti, 2004), or, in the influential southern African vernacular,
they are exhortations to exhibit ubuntu, the Nguni term for humanness
or human excellence (Mokgoro, 1998; Tutu, 1999:32–35; Khoza, 2006).
According to this ethic, the ultimate answer to the question of why one
should live one way rather than another is the fact that it would make
one a better person. There is a distinctively human and higher part of our
nature and a lower, animal self, and both can be realized to various degrees.
That is, the thought is that one can be more or less of a human, person,
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7
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or self, and one’s basic aim in life should be to develop one’s humanness,
personhood, or self hood as much as one can. Indeed, it is common for
those from indigenous African cultures to describe those who are wicked as
“not persons,” “zero-persons,” or even “animals” (Wiredu, 1992:199–200;
Gyekye, 1997:49–51; Nkulu-N’Sengha, 2009:144).3
Turning to the second part of the maxims, one becomes a real self
“because we are” or a complete person “through other persons,” which
roughly means insofar as one prizes communal or harmonious relationships with others. As Augustine Shutte, who has provided a book-length
interpretation of an ubuntu ethic, remarks, “Our deepest moral obligation
is to become more fully human. And this means entering more and more
deeply into community with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded” (2001:30). It is common for ethicists working
in the African tradition to maintain, or at least to suggest, that the only
comprehensive respect in which one can exhibit human excellence is by
relating to others communally or harmoniously.
To begin to appreciate how one large swathe of African moral thought
has been fundamentally relational, consider these remarks about sub-Saharan
values and norms from theorists who are from various parts of the continent:
“(I)n African societies, immorality is the word or deed which
undermines fellowship,” says the Ugandan theologian Peter
Kasenene (1998:21).
“Social harmony is for us (Africans—ed.) the summum bonum—
the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this
sought-after good is to be avoided like the plague,” according to
the South African former Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission Desmond Tutu (1999:35).
“(O)ne should always live and behave in a way that maximises
harmonious existence at present as well as in the future,” prescribes the Zimbabwean academic ethicist Munyaradzi Murove
(2007:181).
“A life of cohesion, or positive integration with others, becomes
a goal, one that people design modalities for achieving. Let us
call this goal communalism, or, as other people have called it,
communitarianism. In light of this goal, the virtues ...also become
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
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desirable,” opines the Kenyan intellectual historian of African
philosophy Dismas Masolo (2010:240).
Talk of “fellowship,” “harmony,” and “cohesion” is recurrent in the
above quotations, which suggest that these are to be valued for their own
sake. That approach differs from the idea that these ways of relating are
valuable merely as a means to some other value, such as the common good
or vital force. It also is prima facie distinct from the most salient philosophical approaches to morally right action in the contemporary West, which
typically appeal at bottom to utility promotion, respect for autonomy, or
agreement in a social contract.
The next question is how one is to understand these relational goods,
or what this article most often refers to as “communion.” Representative
African theorists are again quoted about what it means to live in communion, harmony, etc. with others, after which the article draws on their
comments to advance a principle to guide thought about leadership matters:
“Every member is expected to consider him/herself an integral part of the whole and to play an appropriate role towards
achieving the good of all,” says the Nigerian philosopher Segun
Gbadegesin (1991:65) of his Yoruba people as an example.
“The fundamental meaning of community is the sharing of an
overall way of life, inspired by the notion of the common good,”
suggests the influential Ghanaian moral-political philosopher
Kwame Gyekye (2004:16).
“(T)he purpose of our life is community-service and community-belongingness,” according to the Nigerian-Igbo theologian
Pantaleon Iroegbu (2005:442).
“If you asked ubuntu advocates and philosophers:What principles
inform and organise your life? ...the answers would express commitment to the good of the community in which their identities
were formed, and a need to experience their lives as bound up
in that of their community,” contends the South African public
intellectual Gessler Muxe Nkondo (2007:91).
What is striking about these characterizations of how to commune,
harmonize, or otherwise become a real person is that two distinct relahttps://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7
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tional goods are repeatedly mentioned, namely, considering oneself part
of the whole, sharing a way of life, belonging, and experiencing oneself
as bound up with others, on the one hand, and then achieving the good
of all, advancing the common good, serving the community, and being
committed to the good of one’s society, on the other.
These two facets of a communal relationship have been distinguished
and reconstructed with some precision (Metz, 2017a). It is revealing to
understand the relationship of “identifying” with others or “sharing a way
of life” with them (i.e., belonging, etc.) to be the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes of cohesion and cooperative behavior
consequent to them. The attitudes include a tendency to think of oneself
as a member of a group with the other and to refer to oneself as a “we”
(rather than an “I”), a disposition to feel pride or shame in what the other
or one’s group does and, at a higher level of intensity, an emotional appreciation of the other’s nature and value. The cooperative behaviors include
being transparent about the terms of interaction, allowing others to make
voluntary choices, acting on the basis of trust, adopting common goals,
and, at the extreme end, choosing for the reason that “this is who we are.”
What is labeled the relationship of “exhibiting solidarity” with or “caring” for others (i.e., acting for others’ good, etc.) is similarly aptly construed as the combination of exhibiting certain psychological attitudes
and engaging in helpful behavior. Here, the attitudes are ones positively
oriented towards the other’s good, and they include an empathetic awareness of the other’s condition and a sympathetic emotional reaction to this
awareness. The actions are not merely those likely to be beneficial, that is,
to meet her biological, psychological, and social needs, but also are ones
done consequent to certain motives, say, for the sake of making the other
better off or even a better person.
Bringing things together, here are some concrete and explicit principled
interpretations of “I am because we are” and “A person is a person through
other persons”: one should strive to become a real self, which is matter of
prizing those capable of identity and solidarity. Or, one ought to develop
personhood, which means honoring people by virtue of their dignified ability
to be party to communal relationships of sharing a way of life and caring for
others’ quality of life. Conversely, one lacking in human excellence or who
is “not a person” would be one who fails to respect those able to commune.
Substantial vice or wrongdoing by this ethic consists of prizing the opposite,
discordant relationships of acting on an “us versus them” attitude, subordinating others, harming them, and doing so out of indifference to their good.
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
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To honor communion, or those capable of it, is not a prescription to
promote communion as much as one can, and wherever one can, in the
long run. So, for example, one should give some priority to the communal
relationships of which one is already a part, instead of cutting them off when
doing so would foster marginally more communion on the part of others.
All things being equal, the stronger and longer one’s communal ties with
others, the greater the obligation to help them, even if it comes at some
cost to communal relationship elsewhere in the world. This interpretation
of partiality is meant to reconstruct the traditional sub-Saharan practice of
prioritizing aid to blood relatives (on which see Appiah, 1998).
However, partiality is not meant to be absolute, and the urgent needs
of strangers, who also matter for their own sake by virtue of being capable
of communion, merit consideration and must be weighed up against the
interests of intimates. The impartial idea that every person has dignity is
also prominent in the African tradition (Wiredu, 1992:199–200; Gyekye,
2010:sec. 6), and is expressed here in terms of respecting those with the
natural ability to be communed with and to commune.
There is much more than could be said to spell out and to motivate
this Afro-communal ethic. However, there is enough here to draw some
conclusions about what counts as good leadership, on the supposition that
a moral agent must respect human beings capable of communion, where
those with whom she has already communed are entitled to some priority
relative to strangers, whose needs nonetheless matter by virtue of being
potential sites of communion.

From an Afro-communal ethic to an account of leadership
In the light of the previous section’s analysis, one can now grasp the
import of maxims about leadership from the literature that might otherwise
have been opaque. For example, probably the most common saying in an
African context about good leadership is this: “A king is a king through his
people” (e.g., Pheko & Linchwe, 2008:399, 409; Mofuoa, 2015:32). There
is also this remark: “Leaders have a deep awareness that they are what they
are because of other people” (Nussbaum, Palsule, & Mkhize, 2010:10).
Notice how these maxims echo the ones about personhood (“A person is
a person through other persons”) and self hood (“I am because we are”)
from the previous section. Supposing the communal interpretation of ethical behavior in general made there is plausible, it makes sense to construe
these statements about leadership this way: one should become a real leader,
which one can do insofar as one relates communally and enables others to commune.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7

6

Metz: An African Theory of Good Leadership
Metz  An African Theory of Good Leadership

47

This conception of leadership is an instance of servant leadership, which
phrase abounds in the literature on African approaches to leadership (Mbigi
& Maree, 2005:102; Nicholson, 2005:260–261; Bhengu, 2006:185–187,
229; Khoza, 2006:58–59; Mbigi, 2007:298–301; Msila, 2014; Ndlovu,
2016; Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Ngcaweni, 2017). Broadly speaking, a servant
leader is not so much one who gets others to do what he wants or thinks
best, but is one who does much to help others. Servant leadership is of
course not unfamiliar in the Western literature, but, unlike it, service is
the patently predominant theme in the African literature on leadership.
In addition, the Afro-communal ethic grounds a distinct specification of
precisely what should be involved in serving others: a good leader is one
who helps to meet others’ needs, and above all their need to realize their
social nature by prizing communal relationship.
By this approach, communion is a way of relating to be pursued as an end,
not solely as a means to other values such as, say, productivity or innovation. The Afro-communal ethic should not be read as merely entailing the
banalities that social capital and effective teamwork are useful to succeed
in a competitive environment. Instead, it supports the bolder claim that
a certain way of relating is to be valued for its own sake as a good leader.

Implications of Afro-communal leadership
What would a firm or other large organization look like if it were guided
by the Afro-communal conception of good leadership? This section answers
this question in a variety of contexts, often drawing contrasts with typical
East Asian and Western conceptions of good leadership.
What is the point of a firm?
Prizing communion differs from end-pursuit (Kantianism) or desiresatisfaction (utilitarianism), which are characteristically Western and individualist views of what a firm, or other organization with a large public
influence, ultimately ought to be striving to achieve. Instead of the point
of a firm being to satisfy contingent and variable demand, a firm lead by
Afro-communal values would exhibit solidarity with consumers, meaning
that it would do what is expected to enable them to live objectively better
lives, particularly socio-moral ones.
This orientation towards people’s needs, and especially their virtue, means
that there would be reflection amongst at least shareholders and managers
on whether a firm is selling something that is good for people (Lutz, 2009).
For example, if an Afro-communal leader took over a firm that sold
cigarettes or food with trans fats, she would make a concerted effort to
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
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shift production towards something that, for all we can tell, would not
cause addiction, inflict serious bodily harm, and, as a consequence of these,
disrupt familial and friendly relationships. Consumers might freely elect
to purchase these things, but that is not a sufficient reason to sell them for
one who deems good leadership to consist of prizing communion.
Confucian values, so prominent in East Asia, are also well known for
similarly directing a firm to act in an objectively beneficent way towards
consumers (e.g., Ip, 2009). However, one difference with the Afro-communal approach, in terms of what the final end of a firm should be, is that
Confucianism tends to prize relationship as a final value to be promoted
that can be distinct from the good of individuals. If relationships such as
balance or integration have some significant final value in themselves,
then a leader could wind up treating individuals merely as a means to
the end of promoting them, something admitted by those sympathetic
to Confucianism (e.g., Ip, 2009:470; and Li, 2014:14). In contrast, by the
Afro-communal conception of leadership advanced here, each person has
a dignity in virtue of her capacity to commune and to be communed with,
which means that, to treat every person with respect, a leader must strive
to meet the needs of each.
Whom should a firm aid?
A firm cannot meet the needs of literally all; it must rather attend to those
of its stakeholders. But who counts as a stakeholder, that is, as someone for
whom a firm has moral reason to go out of its way to aid?
In the Western tradition, there are two main moral reasons to help
someone: she is amongst the worst off and so owed aid because of a general
duty to help, or she is someone whom we have assumed an obligation to
aid in particular, say, by promising or by accepting the benefits from a
cooperative scheme of which she is a member. By this largely Kantian and
Rawlsian approach, the leader of a firm roughly must take positive steps to
carry out what it has contracted to do and must also donate, in the form
of a corporate social responsibility program, to those who are especially
badly off.
In addition to these two moral reasons to aid others, the Afro-communal
ethic grounds a third reason: one has already related communally with
others to some extent (Metz, 2017b; Woermann & Engelbrecht, 2019). If
one has been party to a communal relationship with others intensely or
for a long time, and especially both, then one can have some strong moral
reason to aid these intimates as opposed to strangers, even if the latter are
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7
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worse off and if one did not promise to aid the former. Such an approach
plausibly explains why a parent owes more to her children than to other
people’s children.
Applied to a business context, Afro-communal leadership would mean
that a firm goes out of its way to help not merely those in desperate need of
aid or those it has promised to aid, but also those with whom it has shared
a way of life, including its society. African thinkers have sometimes noted
the duty of a firm to aid those near to it (Bhengu, 2006:160–161; Amaeshi
& Idemudia, 2015), but the appeal to Afro-communal leadership explains
why the duty obtains: a firm has identified with the society in which it
is based and therefore has moral reason to exhibit solidarity with it, too.
An additional implication is that if a firm has a long-standing relationship
with a particular supplier, the former’s leaders would have some moral reason
to continue to contract with the latter, even if a new supplier would be
marginally less expensive. The reason is not invariably the most important,
for instance a firm’s leaders need not continue to contract with a supplier
regardless of how expensive its goods or how shoddy its services become.
The point is that there would usually be some moral cost to be considered
when deciding whether to dump a long-standing supplier.
How should a firm make decisions?
An account of which decisions a firm should make (say, when it comes
to which products to make or whom to aid) is one thing, while an account
of how to make those decisions is another. How should business and other
leaders go about determining which policies and practices to adopt?
Here, the Afro-communal theory parts ways with much of both the East
Asian and Western traditions of philosophical thought about leadership.
Typical Western thinkers and managers, appealing to Kantian (or Lockean) ideas, consider consent to be ruled to be sufficient to give managers
the authority to determine the course of a firm. Basically, the fact that
a worker has contracted to submit her labor-power to the direction of a
firm’s managers in exchange for a wage is enough to warrant her obedience to managerial decree. East Asian thinkers and managers, appealing
particularly to Confucianism, consider superior qualifications sufficient to
give managers the authority to govern the workplace (Ip, 2009:469–470).
Both traditions can of course recommend consultation with employees as
often being a useful way to further the proper final ends of a firm. However,
neither approach entails that input, let alone authorization, from employees
is morally required as a way to give them their due. Afro-communal leaderPublished by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
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ship, in contrast, does. Perhaps the most salient theme in the literature on
good leadership in the sub-Saharan tradition is the idea that leaders should
normally deploy consensual democracy when making decisions (Bhengu,
2006:191–193, 230; Nussbaum, 2003; Mbigi & Maree, 2005:8, 29–30,
58–60; Khoza, 2006; Boon, 2007:82–93, 103–109, 125, 150–152; Mbigi,
2007:299–300; Ncube, 2010:79–80). By this approach, it is not enough
to consult with employees or even to give them a vote; in addition, all in
the firm should usually be expected to agree to the essentials before going
forward. Agreeing does not imply that everyone comes to share the same
judgment, but instead means, at the core, that no one has objections to the
proposal so strenuous as to hold back the rest from acting on it.
Such an approach seems to follow from the Afro-communal ethic
expounded above. If a key goal is to realize communion in a firm or other
organization, then a leader will aim to ensure that all genuinely share a
way of life, which includes sharing the power to create it together. Sharing a way of life, as explained above, is not merely people living the same
way, which way of life could be imposed from above. Instead, it essentially
includes cooperative participation, prescribing unanimitarian democracy
not merely when it comes to (representative) political legislation, but also
other major public spheres of life. In addition, such an approach to decisionmaking would best enable people to enjoy a sense of togetherness, thinking
of themselves as a “we” and taking pride in their collective accomplishments. And, then, consensual democracy would usually be expected to
realize solidarity (Gyekye, 1997:130–131, 142). Everyone’s interests are
most likely to be adequately promoted when everyone freely signs onto a
policy consequent to deliberation about it.
Readers might doubt that it is realistic to expect consensus among a large
group of people. For now, on behalf of the consensual model, consider how
the Paris climate change talks were conducted back in 2015. Fascinatingly,
by appealing to conflict resolution techniques used by the Zulu people of
South Africa, some 200 countries, naturally with quite divergent perspectives, were brought to unanimous agreement in about two days’ time (Rathi
2015; cf. Boon 2007).
How should a workplace be organized?
In the 21st century efficiency is invariably sought by means of managerialism, in both the East and the West. That is, in order to maximize outputs
and minimize inputs, subordinates are steered, usually with money or power,
in ways that call for the production of standardized outputs according to
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7
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measurable criteria. Such an approach is thought to be justified philosophically either by the idea that managerialist production would benefit society
or that it has been freely agreed to by workers. Afro-communal leadership,
however, is ambivalent about the aptness of such a mode of production.
On the one hand, a firm has moral reason to commune with shareholders and with consumers, which provides some reason for it to “squeeze”
employees to do what it takes to produce goods/services efficiently. If
managerialism best fostered efficiency of a sort that was likely to make the
lives of shareholders and consumers objectively better off, that would be
some reason for a leader to use it to orient the workplace.
On the other hand, managerialism is on the face of it “anti-social” when
it comes to the way that managers treat employees (as per Metz, 2017c). It
hardly fosters a sense of togetherness between these two groups of people.
Its use of steering mechanisms, such as financial incentives and punitive
threats, is prima facie incompatible with cooperative participation on the
part of workers. In addition, managerialism is unlikely to foster sympathy,
and probably encourages managers to view workers as human resources,
not so much as people whose interests matter for their own sake. Although
workers might gain financially from doing well by managerialist criteria, their own good in the production process is of little interest beyond
avoiding health and safety violations. Still more, if workers are competing
against each other for scarce rewards, as is often the case, then a spirit of
camaraderie amongst them and an inclination of some to sacrifice for the
sake of others are discouraged.
It appears, therefore, that the value of communion pulls in different
directions when it comes to how to organize a workplace. The natural
resolution of the tension is compromise. Here are two examples of how a
leader inspired by Afro-communal values might proceed. First, she might
retain the use of numerical targets that workers must meet, but not set
them down unilaterally. Instead, she could go beyond merely consulting
with workers about targets by obtaining their unanimous agreement to
them, upon discussion of what would be best for all those affected by the
firm. Second, a leader might retain the use of a year-end bonus to express
appreciation and to motivate, but not allocate it strictly in proportion to
the quantified output of individuals. Instead, she could award the same
bonus to all those who have done well enough, if not share profits in a
more robust sense with them (briefly suggested by Bhengu, 2006:179–180,
192; and Ncube, 2010:79).
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2020
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How are emotions of relevance to an organization?
Any plausible view of leadership will entail that a leader is good insofar
as she takes employees’ emotions into account. However, what stands out
about the Afro-communal approach to leadership is that cultivating certain
feelings and attitudes is good for its own sake, not merely as a means to an
end in order to motivate employees to perform, the natural approach of
Confucianism and Kantian contract theory.
A communal relationship is not merely behavioral, that is, not merely a
matter of coordination and mutual aid. It is also psychological and specifically emotional. For one, part of a communal relationship involves a sense
of togetherness such as feeling pride in what others accomplish and liking
being with others. For another, communion includes feeling sympathy and
compassion for others.
Insofar as one major task of a leader is to forge communion in a firm, she
must therefore be committed to prompting such feelings and attitudes, and
do so as ends in themselves. Such a theoretical rationale explains why some
African leadership proponents have been right to recommend—fascinatingly—that an organization include ritual, prayer, song, and dance (Mbigi
& Maree, 2005:50–52, 102, 108; Bhengu, 2006:186–187; Boon, 2007:68,
83). These would be ways to bring people closer together on an emotional
level and thereby to realize communion along a certain dimension.
How should conflict be resolved?
Consider two ways of dealing with actual and potential problems in the
workplace that Afro-communal leadership would abjure. First, note that
American managers are known for having the discretion to fire at will
for under-performance or misbehavior. Many American workers can be
dismissed immediately for failing to perform or even for no cause at all,
an approach that is on the face of it consistent with a contractual ethical
orientation. Second, think about the reputation that Chinese managers in
Africa have for hiring Chinese laborers, and not so much African ones,
because the former are expected to be more highly skilled and compliant
than the latter. Although such practices might in fact not be so widespread
(Xiaoyang, 2016), it is worth considering what would be wrong with them
from an Afro-communal perspective.
There is an underlying similarity between immediately dismissing someone perceived to be a problem in the workplace and not even hiring those
expected to be: exclusion. In contrast, inclusion is a salient theme in the
literature on African leadership. It highlights using emotional intelligence
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/ijel/vol7/iss1/7
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to address conflict, trying hard to develop weak employees, and enabling
everyone to feel part of a community (Blunt & Jones, 1997:15; Nicholson,
2005:261; Boon, 2007:62–63; Msila, 2014:1107). Conspicuously absent
from African thought about leadership are ideas of using fear, imposing
retribution, or simply removing an employee altogether (without having
tried to bring him up to speed).
Again, a focus on communion provides a plausible theoretical explanation of why inclusiveness should be the overarching approach of a good
leader. If what matters morally about us is our capacity to commune and to
be communed with, then respect for that special value will mean creating
relationships and repairing them when they have broken down. Instead of
summarily dismissing an employee who has made a mistake, a good leader
would try to ascertain why she did so, consider whether the employee could
be reformed, and, if so, offer a second chance. And instead of avoiding
hiring people who might be more difficult to work with as employees, a
good leader would give them a chance and do what he could to develop
their abilities, particularly if he were a visitor in their land.
In conclusion, it is not obvious what makes someone a good leader,
particularly in the light of conflicting value systems around the world.
This article has expounded a conception of good leadership that is underappreciated in the English-speaking literature on the topic. Specifically,
it has drawn on the African intellectual tradition to develop a normative
theory of leadership in terms of prizing people by virtue of their capacity to
relate communally. Although some of its concrete prescriptions have already
been recommended in the literature, this article has aimed to show how
they can all be theoretically grounded on the basic value of communion
that is prominent in African philosophical discussions of morality. It has also
sought to argue that these prescriptions constitute plausible alternatives to
what characteristically East Asian or Western accounts of leadership support.
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Notes

1. This article uses geographical labels such as “African” and “Western” to mean features
salient in a large array of space and over a long span of time. Hence, these terms imply
neither that these features can be found solely in this place, nor that they can be found
everywhere in it.
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2. For a survey of how several sub-Saharan peoples understand these maxims, see NkuluN’Sengha (2009).
3. These ascriptions are meant to signify a lack of virtue, but not a lack of dignity or full
moral status; one can be lacking humanness but still be a human being entitled to human
rights.
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